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Abstract. Mobile apps can access a wide variety of secure information,
such as contacts and location. However, current mobile platforms include
only coarse access control mechanisms to protect such data. In this pa-
per, we introduce interaction-based declassification policies, in which the
user’s interactions with the app constrain the release of sensitive infor-
mation. Our policies are defined extensionally, so as to be independent of
the app’s implementation, based on sequences of security-relevant events
that occur in app runs. Policies use LTL formulae to precisely specify
which secret inputs, read at which times, may be released. We formalize
a semantic security condition, interaction-based noninterference, to de-
fine our policies precisely. Finally, we describe a prototype tool that uses
symbolic execution of Dalvik bytecode to check interaction-based de-
classification policies for Android, and we show that it enforces policies
correctly on a set of apps.
Keywords: Information flow, program analysis, symbolic execution.
1 Introduction
The Android platform includes a permission system that aims to prevent apps
from abusing access to sensitive information, such as contacts and location. Un-
fortunately, once an app is installed, it has carte blanche to use any of its per-
missions in arbitrary ways at run time. For example, an app with location and
Internet access could continuously broadcast the device’s location, even if such
behavior is not expected by the user.
To address this limitation, this paper presents a new framework for Android
app security based on information flow control [?] and user interactions. The
key idea behind our framework is that users naturally express their intentions
about information release as they interact with an app. For example, clicking a
? This research was supported in part by NSF grants CNS-1064997 and CNS-1421373,
AFOSR grants FA9550-12-1-0334 and FA9550-14-1-0334, the partnership between
UMIACS and the Laboratory for Telecommunication Sciences, and the National
Security Agency.
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2button may permit an app to release a phone number over the Internet. Or, as
another example, toggling a radio button from “coarse” to “fine” and back to
“coarse” may temporarily permit an app to use fine-grained GPS location rather
than a coarse-grained approximation.
To model these kinds of scenarios, we introduce interaction-based declassi-
fication policies, which extensionally specify what information flows may occur
after which sequences of events. Events are GUI interactions (e.g., clicking a
button), inputs (e.g., reading the phone number), or outputs (e.g., sending over
the Internet). A policy is a set of declassification conditions, written φ  S,
where φ is a linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [18] formula over events, and S
is a sensitivity level. If φ holds at the time an input occurs, then that input is
declassified to level S. We formalize a semantic security condition, interaction-
based noninterference (IBNI), over sets of event traces generated by an app.
Intuitively, IBNI holds of an app and policy if observational determinism [25]
holds after all inputs have been declassified according to the policy. (Section 2
describes policies further, and Section 3 presents our formal definitions.)
We introduce ClickRelease, a static analysis tool to check whether an An-
droid app and its declassification policy satisfy IBNI. ClickRelease generates
event traces using SymDroid [9], a Dalvik bytecode symbolic executor. Click-
Release works by simulating user interactions with the app and recording the
resulting execution traces. In practice, it is not feasible to enumerate all program
traces, so ClickRelease generates traces up to some input depth of n GUI events.
ClickRelease then synthesizes a set of logical formulae that hold if and only if
IBNI holds, and uses Z3 [15] to check their satisfiability. (Section 4 describes
ClickRelease in detail.)
To validate ClickRelease, we used it to analyze four Android apps, including
both secure and insecure variants of those apps. We ran each app variant under
a range of input depths, and confirmed that, as expected, ClickRelease scales
exponentially. However, we manually examined each app and its policy, and
found that an input depth of at most 5 is sufficient to guarantee detection of a
security policy violation (if any) for these cases. We ran ClickRelease at these
minimum input depths and found that it correctly passes and fails the secure
and insecure app variants, respectively. Moreover, at these depths, ClickRelease
takes just a few seconds to run. (Section 5 describes our experiments.)
In summary, we believe that ClickRelease takes an important step forward in
providing powerful new security mechanisms for mobile devices. We expect that
our approach can also be used in other GUI-based, security-sensitive systems.
2 Example Apps and Policies
We begin with two example apps that show interesting aspects of interaction-
based declassification policies.
Bump app. The boxed portion of Fig. 1 gives (simplified) source code for an
Android app that releases a device’s unique ID and/or phone number. This
31 public class BumpApp extends Activity {
2 protected void onCreate(. . .) {
3 Button sendBtn = (Button) findViewById(. . .);
4 CheckBox idBox = (CheckBox) findViewById(. . .);
5 CheckBox phBox = (CheckBox) findViewById(. . .);
6 TelephonyManager manager = TelephonyManager.getTelephonyManager();
7 final int id = manager.getDeviceId();
8 final int ph = manager.getPhoneNumber();
9 idBox.setChecked(false ); phBox.setChecked(false);
10 sendBtn. setOnClickListener (
11 new OnClickListener() {
12 public void onClick(View v) {
13 if (idBox.isChecked())
14 Internet . sendInt( id ); //Internet.sendInt(ph);
15 if (phBox.isChecked())
16 Internet . sendInt(ph); //Internet.sendInt(id);
17 }})}}
id! ∗ ∧(F(sendBtn!unit ∧ last(idBox, true))) Low,
ph! ∗ ∧(F(sendBtn!unit ∧ last(phBox, true))) Low
Fig. 1. “Bump” app and policy.
app is inspired by the Bump app, which let users tap phones to share selected
information with each other. We have interspersed an insecure variant of the app
in the red code on lines 14 and 16, which we will discuss in Section 3.1.
Each screen of an Android app is implemented using a class that extends
Activity. When an app is launched, Android invokes the onCreate method for a
designated main activity. (This is part of the activity lifecycle [8], which includes
several methods called in a certain order. For this simple app, and the other apps
used in this paper, we only need a single activity with this one lifecycle method.)
That method retrieves (lines 3–5) the GUI IDs of a button (marked “send”) and
two checkboxes (marked “ID” and “phone”). The onCreate method next gets
an instance of the TelephonyManager, uses it to retrieve the device’s unique ID
and phone number information, and unchecks the two checkboxes as a default.
Then it creates a new callback (line 11) to be invoked when the “send” button is
clicked. When called, that callback releases the user’s ID and/or phone number,
depending on the checkboxes.
This app is written to work with ClickRelease, a symbolic execution tool we
built to check whether apps satisfy interaction-based declassification policies. As
we discuss further in Section 4, ClickRelease uses an executable model of Android
that abstracts away some details that are unimportant with respect to security.
While a real app would release information by sending it to a web server, here
we instead call a method Internet.sendInt. Additionally, while real apps include
an XML file specifying the screen layout of buttons, checkboxes, and so on,
ClickRelease creates those GUI elements on demand at calls to findViewById
4(since their screen locations are unimportant). Finally, we model the ID and
phone number as integers to keep the analysis simpler.
ClickRelease symbolically executes paths through subject apps, recording a
trace of events that correspond to certain method calls. For example, one path
through this app generates a trace
id!42, ph!43, idBox!true, sendBtn!unit, netout!42
Each event has a name and a value. Here we have used names id and ph for
secret inputs, idBox and sendBtn for GUI inputs, and netout for the network
send. In particular, the trace above indicates 42 is read as the ID, 43 is read
as the phone number, the ID checkbox is selected, the send button is clicked
(carrying no value, indicated by unit), and then 42 is sent on the network. In
ClickRelease, events are generated by calling certain methods that are specially
recognized. For example, ClickRelease implements the manager.getDeviceId call
as both returning a value and emitting an event.
Notice here that in the trace, callbacks to methods such as idBox and sendBtn
correspond to user interactions. The key idea behind our framework is that these
actions convey the user’s intent as to which information should be released. More-
over, traces also contain actions relevant to information release—here the reads
of the ID and phone number, and the network send. Thus, putting both user
interactions and security-sensitive operations together in a single trace allows
our policies to enforce the user’s intent.
The policy for this example app is shown at the bottom of Fig. 1. Policies are
comprised of a set of declassification conditions of the form φS, where φ is an
LTL formula describing event traces and S is a security level. Such a condition
is read, “At any input event, if φ holds at that position of the event trace, then
that input is declassified at level S.” For this app there are two declassification
conditions. The top condition declassifies (to Low) an input that is a read of
the ID at any value (indicated by ∗), if sometime in the future (indicated by
the F modality) the send button is clicked and, when that button is clicked, the
last value of the ID checkbox was true. (Note that last is not primitive, but is
a macro that can be expanded into regular LTL.) The second declassification
condition does the analogous thing for the phone number.
To check such a policy, ClickRelease symbolic executes the program, generat-
ing per-path traces; determines the classification level of every input; and checks
that every pair of traces satisfies noninterference. Note that using LTL provides
a very general and expressive way to describe the sequences of events that imply
declassification. For example, here we precisely capture that only the last value
of the checkbox matters for declassification. For example, if a user selects the ID
checkbox but then unselects it and clicks send, the ID may not be released.
Although this example relies on a direct flow, ClickRelease can also detect
implicit flows. Section 3.2 defines an appropriate version of noninterference, and
the experiments in Section 5 include a subject program with an implicit flow.
Notice this policy depends on the app reading the ID and phone number
when the app starts. If the app instead waited until after the send button were
518 public class ToggleRes extends Activity { . . .
19 LocSharer mLocSharer = new LocSharer();
20 RadioManager mRadio = new RadioManager();
21 protected void onCreate(. . .) { . . .}
22 private class LocSharer implements LocationListener { . . .
23 public LocSharer(RadioManager rm) {
24 lm = (LocationManager) getSystemService(LOCATION SERVICE);
25 lm.requestLocationUpdates(mCurrentProvider, SHARE INTERVAL, distance, this);
26 }
27 public void onLocationChanged(Location l) {
28 if (mRadio.mFine) {
29 Internet . sendInt( l .mLatitude);
30 Internet . sendInt( l .mLongitude);
31 } else {
32 Internet . sendInt( l .mLatitude & 0 xffffff00 );
33 Internet . sendInt( l .mLongitude & 0 xffffff00 );
34 } } }
35 private class RadioManager
36 implements OnClickListener {
37 public boolean mFine = false;
38 public void onClick(View v) { mFine = !mFine; }
39 } }
longitude! ∗ ∧last(mRadio, true) Low,
longitude! ∗ ∧last(mRadio, false)MaskLower8
Fig. 2. Location sharing app and policy.
clicked, it would violate this policy. We could address this by replacing the F
modality by P (past) in the policy, and we could form a disjunction of the two
policies if we wanted to allow either implementation. More generally, we designed
our framework to be sensitive to such choices to support reasoning about secret
values that change over time. We will see an example next.
Location resolution toggle app. Fig. 2 gives code for an app that shares location
information, either at full or truncated resolution depending on a radio button
setting. The app’s onCreate method displays a radio button (code not shown) and
then creates and registers a new instance of RadioManager to be called each time
the radio button is changed. That class maintains field mFine as true when the
radio button is set to full resolution and false when set to truncated resolution.
Separately, onCreate registers LocSharer to be called periodically with the
current location. It requests location updates by registering a callback with the
LocationManager system service. When called, LocSharer releases the location,
either at full resolution or with the lower 8 bits masked, depending on mFine.
The declassification policy for longitude appears below the code; the policy
for latitude is analogous. This policy allows the precise longitude to be released
when mRadio is set to fine, but only the lower eight bits to be released if mRadio
6Primitives p ::= n | true | false | unit | f(p1, . . . , pi)
Events η ::= name!p
Traces t ::= η list
(a) Event and Trace Definitions.
Policies P ::= C1, C2, . . .
Conditions C ::= φ S
Security Levels S ::= High | Low | MaskLower8 | . . .
Atoms A ::= name!s | s⊕ s
Messages s ::= x | p | ∗
Formulae φ ::= A | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ→ φ | ∃x.φ | ∀x.φ
| Xφ | φ U φ | Gφ | Fφ | φ S φ | Pφ
(b) Interaction-based Declassification Policy Language.
Fig. 3. Formal definitions.
is set to coarse. Here ClickRelease knows that at the MaskLower8 level, it should
consider outputs to be equivalent up to differences in the lower 8 bits.
Finally, notice that this policy does not use the future modality. This is
deliberate, because location may be read multiple times during the execution, at
multiple values, and the security level of those locations should depend on the
state of the radio button at that time. For example, consider a trace
mRadio!false, longitude!v1,mRadio!true, longitude!v2
The second declassification condition (longitude!∗∧last(mRadio, false)) will match
the event with v1, since the last value of mRadio was false, and thus v1 may be
declassified only to MaskLower8. Whereas the first declassification condition will
match the event with v2, hence it may be declassified to Low.
3 Program Traces and Security Definition
Next, we formally define when a set of program traces satisfies an interaction-
based declassification policy.
3.1 Program Traces
Fig. 3(a) gives the formal syntax of events and traces. Primitives p are terms
that can be carried by events, e.g., values for GUI events, secret inputs, or
network sends. In our formalism, primitives are integers, booleans, and terms
constructed from primitives using uninterpreted constructors f . As programs
execute, they produce a trace t of events η, where each event name!p pairs an
event name name with a primitive p. We assume event names are partitioned into
7those corresponding to inputs and those corresponding to outputs. For all the
examples in this paper, all names are inputs except netout, which is an output.
Due to space limitations, we omit details of how traces are generated. These
details, along with definition of our LTL formulas, can be found in appendices A
and B, respectively. Instead, we simply assume there exists some set T containing
all possible traces a given program may generate. For example, consider the
insecure variant bump app in Fig. 1, which replaces the black code with the
red code on lines lines 14 and 16. This app sends the phone number when the
email box is checked and vice-versa. Thus, its set T contains, among others, the
following two traces:
id!0, ph!0, idBox!true, sendBtn!unit, netout!0 (1)
id!0, ph!1, idBox!true, sendBtn!unit, netout!1 (2)
In the first trace, ID and phone number are read as 0, the ID checkbox is selected,
the button is clicked, and 0 is sent. The second trace is similar, except the phone
number and sent value are 1. Below, we use these traces to show this program
violates its security policy.
3.2 Interaction-based Declassification Policies
We now define our policy language precisely. Fig. 3(b) gives the formal syntax of
declassification policies. A policy P is a set of declassification conditions Ci of the
form φiSi, where φi is an LTL formula describing when an input is declassified,
and Si is a security level at which the value in that event is declassified.
As is standard, security levels S form a lattice. For our framework, we require
that this lattice be finite. We include High and Low security levels, and we can
generalize to arbitrary lattices in a straightforward way. Here we include the
MaskLower8 level from Fig. 2 as an example, where Low v MaskLower8 v High.
Note that although we include High in the language, in practice there is no reason
to declassify something to level High, since then it remains secret.
The atomic predicates A of LTL formulae match events, e.g., atomic predi-
cate name!p matches exactly that event. We include ∗ for matches to arbitrary
primitives. We allow event values to be variables that are bound in an enclosing
quantifier. The atomic predicates also include atomic arithmetic statements; here
⊕ ranges over standard operations such as +, <, etc. The combination of these
lets us describe complex events. For example, we could write ∃x.spinner!x∧x > 2
to indicate the spinner was selected with a value greater than 2.
Atomic predicates are combined with the usual boolean connectives (¬, ∧,
∨, →) and existential and universal quantification. Formulae include standard
LTL modalities X (next), U (until), G (always), F (future), φ S ψ (since), and
Pφ (past). We include a wide range of modalities, rather than a minimal set,
to make policies easier to write. Formulae also include last(name, p), which is
syntactic sugar for ¬(name!∗) S name!p. We assume a standard interpretation
of LTL formulae over traces [13]. We write t, i |= φ if trace t is a model of φ at
position i in the trace.
8Next consider a trace t ∈ T for an arbitrary program. We write level(t, P, i)
for the security level that policy P assigns to the event t[i]:
level(t, P, i) =
{d
φjSj∈P {Sj | t, i |= φj} t[i] = name!p
Low t[i] = netout!p
In other words, for inputs, we take the greatest lower bound (the most de-
classified) of the levels from all declassification conditions that apply. We always
consider network outputs to be declassified. Notice that if no policy applies, the
level is H by definition of greatest lower bound.
For example, consider trace (1) above with respect to the policy in Fig. 1. At
position 0, the LTL formula holds because the ID box is eventually checked and
then the send button is clicked, so level((1), P, 0) = Low. However, level((1), P, 1) =
High because no declassification condition applies for ph (phBox is never checked).
And level((1), P, 4) = Low, because that position is a network send.
Next consider applying this definition to the GUI inputs. As written, we
have level((1), P, 2) = level((1), P, 3) = High. However, our app is designed to
leak these inputs. For example, an adversary will learn the state of idBox if they
receive a message with an ID. Thus, for all the subject apps in this paper, we also
declassify all GUI inputs as Low. For the example in Fig. 1, this means adding
the conditions idBox! ∗Low, phBox! ∗Low, and sendBtn! ∗Low. In general,
the security policy designer should decide the security level of GUI inputs.
Next, we can apply level pointwise across a trace and discard any trace
elements that are below a given level S. We define
level(t, P )S [i] =
{
t[i] level(t, P, i) v S
τ otherwise
We write level(t, P )S,in for the same filtering, except output events (i.e., network
sends) are removed as well. Considering the traces (1) and (2) again, we have
level((1), P )Low=id!0, idBox!true, sendBtn!unit, netout!0
level((2), P )Low=id!0, idBox!true, sendBtn!unit, netout!1
level((1), P )Low,in=id!0, idBox!true, sendBtn!unit
level((2), P )Low,in=id!0, idBox!true, sendBtn!unit
Finally, we can define a program to satisfy noninterference if, for every pair
of traces such that the inputs at level S are the same, the outputs at level S are
also the same. To account for generalized lattice levels such as MaskLower8, we
also need to treat events that are equivalent at a certain level as the same. For
example, at MaskLower8, outputs 0xffffffff and 0xffffff00 are the same,
since they do not differ in the upper 24 bits. Thus, we assume for each security
level S there is a appropriate equivalence relation =S , e.g., for MaskLower8, it
compares elements ignoring their lower 8 bits. Note that x =Low y is simply
x = y and x =High y is always true.
9Definition 1 (Interaction-based Noninterference (IBNI)). A program sat-
isfies security policy P , if for all S and for all t1, t2 ∈ T (the set of traces of the
program) the following holds:
level(t1, P )
S,in =S level(t2, P )
S,in =⇒ level(t1, P )S =S level(t2, P )S
Looking at traces for the insecure app, we see they violate non-interference,
because level((1), P )Low,in = level((2), P )Low,in, but level((1), P )Low 6= level((2), P )Low
(they differ in the output). We note that our definition of noninterference makes
it a 2-hypersafety property [6,?].
4 Implementation
We built a prototype tool, ClickRelease, to check whether Android apps obey
the interaction-based declassification policies described in Section 3. ClickRe-
lease is based on SymDroid [9], a symbolic executor for Dalvik bytecode, which
is the bytecode format to which Android apps are compiled. As is standard, Sym-
Droid computes with symbolic expressions that may contain symbolic variables
representing sets of values. At conditional branches that depend on symbolic
variables, SymDroid invokes Z3 [15] to determine whether one or both branches
are feasible. As it follows branches, SymDroid extends the current path condition,
which tracks branches taken so far, and forks execution when multiple paths are
possible. Cadar and Sen [1] describe symbolic execution in more detail.
SymDroid uses the features of symbolic execution to implement nondetermin-
istic event inputs (such as button clicks or spinner selections), up to a certain
bound. Since we have symbolic variables available, we also use them to represent
arbitrary secret inputs, as discussed below in Sec. 4.2. There are several issues
that arise in applying SymDroid to checking our policies, as we discuss next.
4.1 Driving App Execution
Android apps use the Android framework’s API, which includes classes for re-
sponding to events via callbacks. We could try to account for these callbacks
by symbolically execution Android framework code directly, but past experience
suggests this is intractable: the framework is large, complicated, and includes na-
tive code. Instead, we created an executable model, written in Java, that mimics
key portions of Android needed by our subject apps. Our Android model includes
facilities for generating clicks and other GUI events (such as the View, Button,
and CheckBox classes, among others). It also includes code for LocationManager,
TelephonyManager, and other basic Android classes.
In addition to code modeling Android, the model also includes simplified ver-
sions of Java library classes such as StringBuffer and StringBuilder. Our versions
of these APIs implement unoptimized versions of methods in Java and escape to
internal SymDroid functions to handle operations that would be unduly complex
to symbolically execute. For instance, SymDroid represents Java String objects
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with OCaml strings instead of Java arrays of characters. It thus models methods
such as String.concat with internal calls to OCaml string manipulation functions.
Likewise, reflective methods such as Class.getName are handled internally.
For each app, we created a driver that uses our Android model to simulate
user input to the GUI. The driver is specific to the app since it depends on
the app’s GUI. The driver begins by calling the app’s onCreate method. Next it
invokes special methods in the Android model to inject GUI events. There is one
such method for each type of GUI element, e.g., buttons, checkboxes, etc. For
example, Trace.addClick(id) generates a click event for the given id and then calls
the appropriate event handler. The trace entry contains the event name for that
kind of element, and a value if necessary. Event handlers are those that the app
registered through standard Android framework mechanisms, e.g., in onCreate.
Let m be the number of possible GUI events. To simulate one arbitrary
GUI event, the driver uses a block that branches m ways on a fresh symbolic
variable, with a different GUI action in each branch. Typical Android apps never
exit unless the framework kills them, and thus we explore sequences of events
only up to a user-specified input depth n. Thus, in total, the driver will execute
at least mn paths.
4.2 Symbolic Variables in Traces
In addition to GUI inputs, apps also use secret inputs. We could use SymDroid to
generate concrete secret inputs, but instead we opt to use a fresh symbolic vari-
able for each secret input. For example, the call to manager.getDeviceId in Fig. 1
returns a symbolic variable, and the same for the call to manager.getPhoneNumber.
This choice makes checking policies using symbolic execution a bit more power-
ful, since, e.g., a symbolic integer variable represents an arbitrary 32-bit integer.
Note that whenever ClickRelease generates a symbolic variable for a secret input,
it also generates a trace event corresponding to the input.
Recall that secret inputs may appear in traces, and thus traces may now
contain symbolic variables. For example, using αi’s as symbolic variables for the
secret ID and phone number inputs, the traces (1) and (2) become
id!α1, ph!α2, idBox!true, sendBtn!unit, netout!α2 (1
′)
id!α1, ph!α2, idBox!true, sendBtn!unit, netout!α2 (2
′)
We must take care when symbolic variables are in traces. Recall level checks
t, i |= φ and then assigns a security level to position i. If φ depends on symbolic
variables in t, we may not be able to decide this. For example, if the third
element in (1′) were idBox!α3, then we would need to reason with conditional
security levels such as level(t, P, 0) = if α3 then Low else High. We avoid the
need for such reasoning by only using symbolic variables for secret inputs, and
by ensuring the level assigned by a policy does not depend on the value of a
secret input. We leave supporting more complex reasoning to future work.
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4.3 Checking Policies with Z3
Each path explored by SymDroid yields a pair (t, Φ), where t is the trace and
Φ is the path condition. ClickRelease uses Z3 to check whether a given set of
such trace–path condition pairs satisfies a policy P . Recall that Definition 1
assumes for each S there is an =S relation on traces. We use the same relation
below, encoding it as an SMT formula. For our example lattice, =High produces
true, =Low produces a conjunction of equality tests among corresponding trace
elements, and =MaskLower8 produces the conjunction of equality tests of the
bitwise-and of every element with 0xffffff00.
Given a trace t, let t′ be t with its symbolic variables primed, so that the
symbolic variables of t and t′ are disjoint. Given a path condition Φ, define Φ′
similarly. Now we can give the algorithm for checking a security policy.
Algorithm 1 To check a set T of trace–path condition pairs, do the following.
Let P be the app’s security policy. Apply level across each trace to obtain the
level of each event. For each (t1, Φ1) and (t2, Φ2) in T × T , and for each S, ask
Z3 whether the following formula (the negation of Definition 1) is unsatisfiable:
level(t1, P )
S,in =S level(t
′
2, P )
S,in ∧ level(t1, P )S 6=S level(t′2, P )S ∧ Φ1 ∧ Φ′2
If no such formula is unsatisfiable, then the program satisfies noninterference.
We include Φ1 and Φ
′
2 to constrain the symbolic variables in the trace. More
precisely, t1 represents a set of concrete traces in which its symbolic variables
are instantiated in all ways that satisfy Φ1, and analogously for t
′
2.
If the above algorithm finds an unsatisfiable formula, then Z3 returns a coun-
terexample, which SymDroid uses in turn to generate a pair of concrete traces as
a counterexample. For example, consider traces (1’) and (2’) above, and prime
symbolic variables in (2’). Those traces have the trivial path condition true, since
neither branches on a symbolic input. Thus, the formula passed to Z3 will be:
α1 = α
′
1∧true = true∧unit = unit∧
(
α1 6= α′1∨true 6= true∨unit 6= unit∨α2 6= α′2
)
Thus we can see a satisfying assignment with α1 = α
′
1 and α2 6= α′2, hence
noninterference is violated.
4.4 Minimizing Calls to Z3
A naive implementation of the noninterference check generates n2 equations,
where n is the number of traces produced by ClickRelease to be checked by Z3.
However, we observed that many of these equations correspond to pairs of traces
with different sequences of GUI events. Since GUI events are low inputs in all
our policies, these pairs trivially satisfy noninterference (the left-hand side of the
implication in Definition 1 is false). Thus, we need not send those equations to
Z3 for an (expensive) noninterference check.
We exploit this observation by organizing SymDroid’s output traces into a
tree, where each node represents an event, with the initial state at the root.
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Traces with common prefixes share the same ancestor traces in the tree. We
systematically traverse this tree using a cursor t1, starting from the root. When
t1 reaches a new input event, we then traverse the tree using another cursor t2,
also starting from the root. As t2 visits the tree, we do not invoke Z3 on any
traces with fewer input events than t1 (since they are not low-equivalent to t1).
We also skip any subtrees where input events differ.
5 Experiments
To evaluate ClickRelease, we ran it on four apps, including the two described in
Section 2. We also ran ClickRelease on several insecure variants of each app, to
ensure it can detect the policy violations. The apps and their variants are:
– Bump. The bump app and its policy appear in Fig. 1. The first insecure
variant counts clicks to the send button sends the value of the ID after three
clicks, regardless of the state of the ID checkbox. The second (indicated in
the comments in the program text) swaps the released information—if the ID
box is checked, it releases the phone number, and vice-versa.
– Location toggle. The location toggle app and its policy appear in Fig. 2. The
first insecure variant always shares fine-grained location information, regard-
less of the radio button setting. The second checks if coarse-grain information
is selected. If so, it stores the fine-grained location (but does not send it yet).
If later the fine-grained radio button is selected, it sends the stored location.
Recall this is forbidden by the app’s security policy, which allows the release
only of locations received while the fine-grained option is set.
– Contact picker. We developed a contact picker app that asks the user to select
a contact from a spinner and then click a send button to release the selected
contact information over the network. The security policy for this app requires
that no contact information leaks unless it is the last contact selected before
the button click. (For example, if the user selects contact 1, selects contact 2,
and then clicks the button, only contact 2 may be released.) Note that since
an arbitrarily sized list of contacts would be difficult for symbolic execution
(since then there would be an unbounded number of ways to select a contact),
we limit the app to a fixed set of three contacts. The first insecure variant of
this app scans the set of contacts for a specific one. If found, it sends a message
revealing that contact exists before sending the actual selected contact. The
second insecure variant sends a different contact than was selected.
– WhereRU. Lastly, we developed an app that takes push requests for the user’s
location and shares it depending on user-controlled settings. The app contains
a radio group with three buttons, “Share Always,” “Share Never,” and “Share
On Click.” There is also a “Share Now” button that is enabled when the “Share
On Click” radio button is selected. When a push request arrives, the security
policy allows sharing if (1) the “Always” button is selected, or (2) the “On
Click” button is selected and the user presses “Share Now.” Note that, in the
second case, the location may change between the time the request arrives
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Fig. 4. Runtime vs. number of events.
and the time the user authorizes sharing; the location to be shared is the
one in effect when the user authorized sharing, i.e., the one from the most
recent location update before the button click. Also, rather than include the
full Android push request API in our model, we simulated it using a basic
callback. This app has two insecure variants. In the first one, when the user
presses the “Share Now” button, the app begins continuously sharing (instead
of simply sharing the single location captured on the button press). In the
second, the app shares the location immediately in response to all requests.
Scalability. We ran our experiments on a 4-core i7 CPU @3.5GHz with 16GB
RAM running Ubuntu 14. For each experiment we report the median of 10 runs.
In our first set of experiments, we measured how ClickRelease’s performance
varies with input depth. Figure 4 shows running time (log scale) versus input
depth for all programs and variants. For each app, we ran to the highest input
depth that completed in one hour.
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Input Time (ms)
App Depth Exploration Analysis Total
Bump 3 114 15 142
Bump (insecure 1) 5 2,100 1,577 3,690
Bump (insecure 2) 4 266 70 344
Location toggle 2 113 12 128
Location toggle (insecure 1) 2 143 12 163
Location toggle (insecure 2) 3 117 12 143
Contact picker 2 79 2 94
Contact picker (insecure 1) 2 325 27 361
Contact picker (insecure 2) 2 149 9 170
WhereRU 3 849 183 1,045
WhereRU (insecure 1) 3 860 234 1,108
WhereRU (insecure 2) 2 257 10 280
Fig. 5. Results at minimum input depth.
For each app, we see that running time grows exponentially, as expected.
The maximum input depth before timeout (i.e., where each curve ends) ranges
from five to nine. The differences have to do with the number of possible events
at each input point. For example, WhereRU has seven possible input events, so
it has the largest possible “fan out” and times out with an input depth of five.
In contrast, Bump and Location Toggle have just three input events and time
out with an input depth of nine. Notice also the first insecure variant of Contact
Picker times out after fewer events than the other variants. Investigating further,
this occurs due to that app’s implicit flow (recall the app branches on the value
of a secret input). Implicit flows cause symbolic execution to take additional
branches depending on the (symbolic) secret value.
Minimum Input Depth. Next, for each variant, we manually calculated a min-
imum input depth guaranteed to find a policy violation. To do so, first we de-
termined possible app GUI states. For example, in Bump (Fig. 1), there is a
state with idBox and phBox both checked, a state with just idBox checked, etc.
Then we examined the policy and recognized that certain input sequences lead
to equivalent states modulo the policy. For example, input sequences that click
idBox an even number of times and then click send are all equivalent. Full anal-
ysis reveals that an input depth of three (which allows the checkboxes to be set
any possible way followed by a button click) is sufficient to reach all possible
states for this policy. We performed similar analysis on other apps and variants.
Fig. 5 summarizes the results of running with the minimum input depth for
each variant, with the depths listed in the second column. We confirmed that,
when run with this input depth, ClickRelease correctly reports the benign app
variants as secure and the other app variants as insecure. The remaining columns
of Fig. 5 report ClickRelease’s running time (in milliseconds), broken down by
the exploration phase (where SymDroid generates the set of symbolic traces) and
the analysis phase (where SymDroid forms equations about this set and checks
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them using Z3). Looking at the breakdown between exploration and analysis, we
see that the former dominates the running time, i.e., most of the time is spent
simply exploring program executions. We see the total running time is typically
around a second or less, while for the first insecure variant of Bump it is closer
to 4 seconds, since it uses the highest input depth.
Our results show that while ClickRelease indeed scales exponentially, to ac-
tually find security policy violations we need only run it with a low input depth,
which takes only a small amount of time.
6 Limitations and Future Work
There are several limitations of ClickRelease we plan to address in future work.
Thus far we have applied ClickRelease to a set of small apps that we de-
veloped. There are two main engineering challenges in applying ClickRelease to
other apps. First, our model of Android (Section 4.1) only includes part of the
framework. To run on other apps, it will need to be expanded with more Android
APIs. Second, we speculate that larger apps may require longer input depths to
go from app launch to interfering outputs. In these cases, we may be able to
start symbolic execution “in the middle” of an app (e.g., as in the work of Ma
et al. [14]) to skip uninteresting prefixes of input events.
ClickRelease also has several limitations related to its policy language. First,
ClickRelease policies are fairly low level. Complex policies—e.g., in which clicking
a certain button releases multiple pieces of information—can be expressed, but
are not very concise. We expect as we gain more experience writing ClickRelease
policies, we will discover useful idioms that should be incorporated into the policy
language. Similarly, situations where several methods in sequence operate on and
send information should be supported. Second, currently ClickRelease assumes
there is a single adversary who watches netout. It should be straightforward to
generalize to multiple output channels and multiple observers, e.g., to model
inter-app communication. Third, we do not consider deception by apps, e.g., we
assume the policy writer knows whether the sendBtn is labeled appropriately as
“send” rather than as “exit.” We leave looking for such deceptive practices to
future work.
Finally, since ClickRelease explores a limited number of program paths it is
not sound, i.e., it cannot guarantee the absence of policy violations in general.
However, in our experiments we were able to manually analyze apps to show
that exploration up to a certain input depth was sufficient for particular apps,
and we plan to investigate generalizing this technique in future work.
7 Related Work
ClickRelease is the first system to enforce extensional declassification policies in
Android apps. It builds on a rich history of research in usable security, informa-
tion flow, and declassification.
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One of the key ideas in ClickRelease is that GUI interactions indicate the se-
curity desires of users. Roesner et al. [20] similarly propose access control gadgets
(ACGs), which are GUI elements that, when users interact with them, grant per-
missions. Thus, ACGs and ClickRelease both aim to better align security with
usability [24]. ClickRelease addresses secure information flow, especially propa-
gation of information after its release, whereas ACGs address only access control.
Android-based systems. TaintDroid [7] is a run-time information-flow tracking
system for Android. It monitors the usage of sensitive information and detects
when that information is sent over insecure channels. Unlike ClickRelease, Taint-
Droid does not detect implicit flows.
AppIntent [23] uses symbolic execution to derive the context, meaning in-
puts and GUI interactions, that causes sensitive information to be released in an
Android app. A human analyst examines that context and makes an expert judg-
ment as to whether the release is a security violation. ClickRelease instead uses
human-written LTL formulae to specify whether declassifications are permitted.
It is unclear from [23] whether AppIntent detects implicit flows.
Pegasus [2] combines static analysis, model checking, and run-time monitor-
ing to check whether an app uses API calls and privileges consistently with users’
expectations. Those expectations are expressed using LTL formulae, similarly to
ClickRelease. Pegasus synthesizes a kind of automaton called a permission event
graph from the app’s bytecode then checks whether that automaton is a model
for the formulae. Unlike ClickRelease, Pegasus does not address information flow.
Jia et al. [10] present a system, inspired by Flume [12], for run-time enforce-
ment of information flow policies at the granularity of Android components and
apps. Their system allows components and apps to perform trust declassifica-
tion according to capabilities granted to them in security labels. In contrast,
ClickRelease reasons about declassification in terms of user interactions.
Security type systems Security type systems [?] statically disallow programs
that would leak information. O’Neill et al. [17] and Clark and Hunt [5] define
interactive variants of noninterference and present security type systems that
are sound with respect to these definitions.
Integrating declassification with security type systems has been the focus of
much research. Chong and Myers [3] introduce declassification policies that con-
ditionally downgrade security labels. Their policies use classical propositional
logic for the conditions. ClickRelease can be seen as providing a more expres-
sive language for conditions by using LTL to express formulae over events. SIF
(Servlet Information Flow) [4] is a framework for building Java servlets with
information-flow control. Information managed by the servlet is annotated in
the source code with security labels, and the compiler ensures that information
propagates in ways that are consistent with those labels. The SIF compiler is
based on Jif [16], an information-flow variant of Java.
All of these systems require adding type annotations to terms in the pro-
gram code, e.g., method parameters, etc. In contrast, ClickRelease policies are
described in terms of app inputs and outputs.
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Event Based Models and Declassification Vaughan and Chong [22] define ex-
pressive declassification policies that allow functions of secret information to be
released after events occur, and extend the Jif compiler to infer events. ClickRe-
lease instead ties events to user interactions.
Rafnsson et al. [19] investigate models, definitions, and enforcement tech-
niques for secure information flow in interactive programs in a purely theoretical
setting. Sabelfeld and Sands [21] survey approaches to secure declassification in a
language-based setting. ClickRelease can be seen as addressing their “what” and
“when” axes of declassification goals: users of Android apps interact with the
GUI to control when information may be released, and the GUI is responsible
for conveying to the user what information will be released.
8 Conclusion
We introduced interaction-based declassification policies, which describe what
and when information can flow. Policies are defined using LTL formulae describ-
ing event traces, where events include GUI actions, secret inputs, and network
sends. We formalized our policies using a trace-based model of apps based on
security relevant events. Finally, we described ClickRelease, which uses sym-
bolic execution to check interaction-based declassification policies on Android,
and showed that ClickRelease correctly enforces policies on four apps, with one
secure and two insecure variants each.
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A Operational Semantics / Trace Generation
To illustrate how traces are generated, we introduce an operational semantics
for a model of Android programs. Our semantics uses an abstract machine which
transitions between states and reads messages on a message queue. A state is a
tuple (M,σ,H) that includes a message queue M , which is a list of pairs of a
channel and a primitive; a heap σ, which maps locations to values; and a handler
map H, which maps channel names to functions installed to handle events on
those channels. Each channel may have at most one handler. We write Σ.X
(where X could be M , σ, or H), to mean the X component of Σ. Similarly, we
write Σ[X 7→ X ′] to mean Σ with the X component replaced by X ′.
As programs execute, they produce a trace t of events η. Events are writes,
written name!p, of primitive p from channel name. We also include an empty
event τ , which is the identity of trace concatenation.
Our semantics is stratified into two levels: a big-step semantics, shown at the
top of Fig. 6, which models evaluation of code in a handler, and a small-step
semantics, shown at the bottom of the figure, which models the message queue.
The semantics generates sets of traces containing input and output messages.
The big-step semantics proves judgments of the form e,Σ1 ⇓ v,Σ2, meaning
evaluation of expression e in state Σ1 produces a value v and new state Σ2.
The first several rules are standard. RVal evaluates a value to itself, without
changing the state. RApp evaluates e1 to a lambda, evaluates e2 to a value, and
then evaluates the body of the lambda with the actual argument substituted
for the formal variable: we use the notation e{x 7→ v} for e when unbound
occurrences of x in e have been syntactically replaced with v. RRef evaluates e
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e,Σ1 ⇓ v,Σ2
RVal
v,Σ ⇓ v,Σ
RApp
e1, Σ1 ⇓ (λx.e3), Σ2 e2, Σ2 ⇓ v1, Σ3
e3{x 7→ v1}, Σ3 ⇓ v2, Σ4
e1 e2, Σ1 ⇓ v2, Σ4
RRef
e,Σ1 ⇓ v,Σ2 ` 6∈ dom(Σ2.σ)
σ′ = (Σ2.σ)[` 7→ v]
ref e,Σ ⇓ `,Σ2[σ 7→ σ′]
RAssign
e1, Σ1 ⇓ `,Σ2 ` ∈ dom(Σ2.σ)
e2, Σ2 ⇓ v,Σ3 σ′ = (Σ3.σ)[` 7→ v]
e1 := e2, Σ1 ⇓ v,Σ3[σ 7→ σ′]
RDeref
e,Σ1 ⇓ `,Σ2 (Σ2.σ)(`) = v
!e,Σ1 ⇓ v,Σ2
RIfTrue
e1, Σ1 ⇓ true, Σ2 e2, Σ2 ⇓ v,Σ3
if e1 then e2 else e3, Σ1 ⇓ v,Σ3
RIfFalse
e1, Σ1 ⇓ false, Σ2 e3, Σ2 ⇓ v,Σ3
if e1 then e2 else e3, Σ1 ⇓ v,Σ3
ROp
e1, Σ1 ⇓ v1, Σ2 e2, Σ2 ⇓ v2, Σ3
e1 ⊕ e2, Σ1 ⇓ v1 ⊕ v2, Σ3
RCstr
ei, Σi ⇓ vi, Σi+1 i ∈ 1..n
f(e1, . . . , en), Σ1 ⇓ f(v1, . . . , vn), Σi+1
RInst
e1, Σ1 ⇓ (λx.e2), Σ2 H ′ = (Σ2.H)[name 7→ λx.e2]
install name e1, Σ1 ⇓ unit, Σ2[H 7→ H ′]
RProj
e,Σ1 ⇓ f(v1, . . . , vn), Σ2
f−i(e), Σ1 ⇓ vi, Σ2
RSend
e,Σ1 ⇓ p,Σ2 M ′ = (Σ2.M)@(name, p)
send name e,Σ1 ⇓ unit, Σ2[M 7→M ′]
Σ1 →η Σ2 and ` e t
THandle
Σ1.M = (name, p)@M
′ Σ1.H(name) = λx.e
Σ′ = Σ1[M 7→M ′] e{x 7→ p}, Σ′ ⇓ v,Σ2
Σ1 →τ Σ2
TInput
Σ′ = Σ[M 7→ (Σ.M)@(name, p)]
Σ →name!p Σ′
TOutput
Σ.M = (netout, p),M ′
Σ′ = Σ[M 7→M ′]
Σ →netout!p Σ′
TProg
Σ0 = ([(onCreate, unit)], ∅, {onCreate 7→ λx.e}) x 6∈ FV (e)
Σi →ηi Σi+1 i ∈ [0..n]
` e η0 · η1 · · · ηn
Fig. 6. Semantics for our Android subset.
to a value v, finds a fresh location ` in the heap, and then evaluates to `, returning
a state where the heap maps ` to v. RAssign evaluates e1 to a location ` and
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then updates the contents of `. RDeref evaluates e to a location and returns
the contents of that location.
RIfTrue evaluates e1 to a value and if it evaluates to true, evaluates e2.
RIfFalse is analogous. ROp evaluates a binary operation by applying the des-
ignated operation to the values of the two subexpressions.
RCstr and RProj construct terms and project from constructed terms.
Finally, RInst evaluates e1 to a lambda and adds it as a handler for channel
name; the result value is the unit value unit (a nullary constructor). RSend
evaluates e to a primitive p, and then adds the message (name, p) to the end
of the message queue. Here we use @ for concatenation. Note that RSend only
allows primitives to be sent, and not locations or lambda expressions.
The first three rules in small-step semantics at the bottom of Fig. 6 prove
judgments of the form Σ1 →η Σ2, meaning the machine can take a step from
state Σ1 to a new state Σ2, producing an event η. THandle consumes a message
(name, p) from the front of the message queue (recall RSend adds a message to
the end of the message queue), looks up the handler for name, and then invokes
the handler, passing p as its argument. Running a handler is not an externally
visible operation, which is indicated by an empty event τ on the reduction arrow.
TInput models an input message, which may be due to user input (e.g., GUI
clicks) or secret input from the system (e.g., a callback with updated location
information). This rule non-deterministically picks some channel name and an
arbitrary primitive p, and then sends p on that channel. The input is recorded
as an event on the reduction arrow. Notice that here we do not distinguish the
security level of an input—we choose to leave that up to the security policy
designer, who can opt to either always designate GUI inputs as low-security (as
we do in our experiments) or make them high-security.
TOutput models writes to the network, consuming a message from a dis-
tinguished channel netout. Writing to this channel corresponds to the InfoS-
ender.sendInt calls in Section 2. Since these messages may be seen by the observer—
i.e., they are “low visible” outputs—we record the write event on the reduction
arrow. Note that by convention there is no user handler for this channel.
Finally, TProg proves a judgment of the form ` e  t, meaning running
the program e produces a trace t of events. This rule creates an initial state Σ0
in which e is bound as a handler on a special onCreate channel, and the message
queue contains an initial message on that channel. The rule then repeatedly steps
to the next state n + 1 times. It produces the event trace η0 · · · ηn. Notice that
the length of the trace n is nondeterministic; in general, since these are reactive
programs, they can usually run for an any number of steps as long as additional
input arrives.
From the set of all executions of a program we can extract a set of traces,
which we later use to define noninterference.
Definition 2 (Program Traces). We define the set of traces of a program e
as
traces(e) = {t | ` e t}
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t, i |= name!p1 ⇐⇒ t[i] = name!p1
t, i |= name!∗ ⇐⇒ there exists p, t[i] = name!p1
t, i |= p1 ⊕ p2 ⇐⇒ |= p1 ⊕ p2
t, i |= ¬φ ⇐⇒ t, i 6|= φ
t, i |= φ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ t, i |= φ and t, i |= ψ
t, i |= φ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ t, i |= φ or t, i |= ψ
t, i |= φ→ ψ ⇐⇒ t, i |= ψ or t, i |= ¬φ
t, i |= Gφ ⇐⇒ for all j . j ≥ i⇒ (t, j |= φ)
t, i |= Fφ ⇐⇒ there exists j, j ≥ i⇒ (t, j |= φ)
t, i |= Pφ ⇐⇒ there exists j, j ≤ i⇒ (t, j |= φ)
t, i |= φ U ψ ⇐⇒ there exists j, j ≥ i⇒ ((t, j |= ψ) and
for all k, i ≤ k < j ⇒ (t, k |= φ))
t, i |= φ S ψ ⇐⇒ there exists j, j ≤ i⇒ ((t, j |= ψ) and
for all k, j < k ≤ i⇒ (t, k |= φ))
t, i |= ∀x.φ ⇐⇒ for all p, (t, i |= {x 7→ p}φ)
t, i |= ∃x.φ ⇐⇒ there exists p, (t, i |= {x 7→ p}φ)
Fig. 7. Models relation for LTL used in the paper
B Linear Temporal Logic
Figure 7 gives the definition of the models relaion for LTL as used in 3. Note
that we assume an interpretation |= p1 ⊕ p2 for the atomic propositions of the
form p1 ⊕ p2.
